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SELF-IPIEREST AND SOCIAL CONTROL: 
UITLANDEEt RUlX OF JOHANNESBURG, 1900-1901 
by 
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Good government . . . [means] equal rights and no 
privilege . . . , a f a i r  f ie ld  and no favour. (1) 
A. MacFarlane, Chairman, 
Fordsburg Branch, South 
African League. 
A t  the end of May 1900 the Brit ish axmy moved into Johannesburg and Commandant 
F. E. T. Krause handed over the reins of government to Col. Colin MacKenzie, the new 
Military Governor of the Witwatersrand. But MacKenzie could not rule alone, and his 
superior, Lord Roberts, had previously agreed with High Commissioner Milner that 
MacKenzie would have access to  civi l ian advisers who, being Randites for  the most 
past, could offer to  his administration their  knowledge of local affairs. So, up 
from the coast and the Orange Free State came his  advisers: in te r  a l i a ,  
W. F. Monypenny, previously editor of the jingoist Johannesburg-; Douglas 
Forster, past President of the Transvaal Branch of the South African League (SAL); 
Samuel Evans, an Eckstein & CO employee and informal adviser to  Milner; and 
W. Wybergh, another past President of the SAL and an ex-employee of Consolidated 
Gold Fields. 
These men and the others who served MacKenzie as civi l ian aides had been 
active i n  Rand pol i t ics  previous to  the w a r  and had led the agitation for  reform - 
both poli t ical  and economic - which had resulted i n  war .  Many had l inks with the 
minbg industry, ei ther as employees of large firms or as suppliers of machinery, 
while the res t  were i n  business or  were professional men, generally lawyers. It was 
these men who, along with J. P. Fitzpatrick, had engineered the unrest, who 
formulated petitions, organized demonstrations and who channelled to  Milner the grist 
fo r  his poli t ical  m i l l .  Their goal had been to  transform the South African Republic 
and especially the Rand, to  create a government sympathetic t o  industrial capitalism 
and to  eliminate elements which inhibited i t s  development. Working with Milner, they 
t r ied  to  convince the Brit ish parliament and public that the Uitlander (foreign) 
population a t  Johannesburg was a unified community struggling under the weight of 
corruption, tyranny and inefficiency. They had been successful and when wax 
approached they were amongst the f i r s t  to flee, especially when it  was rumoured that 
waxrants fo r  thei r  arrest  had been issued by the Boer government. In  the months 
between the outbreak of w a r  and the f a l l  of Johannesburg, i.e. between mid-October 
1899 and the end of May 1900, they had been active a t  the coast managing Uitlander 
ref'ugee af fa i rs ,  leading the "sheep without a shepherd" (2), to  use Wyberghr S phrase, 
and working i n  and out of the administration a s  advisers, news correspondents, army l 
l recrui ters  and even spies. I 
l 
Now they were called back to  the Rand. It would be many months before the 
mass of Uitlanders would be allowed to return, but i n  the meantime the population of 
the Rand (some 80,000 people along the length of the reef,  half of whom were white 
and about half of the whites l iv ing  i n  Johannesburg i t s e l f )  ( 3 )  had to  be governed. 
This entailed pacifying them - keeping them sober, quiet and out of mischief - as  
well as  furnishing provisions: food, clothes and fuel ,  and work when possible. Yet 
the Uitlander advisers did not confine themselves to  these immediate tasks but se t  
upon a course of creating on the Rand the i r  ideal community. 
While Milner was anxious t o  see Johannesburg restored as  a place of 
business, he was also very keen to  ensure that  the Rand administration got off "in 
the r ight  directionf'. (4) Since the new regime was i n  an embryonic stage, he f e l t  
that  it would be easy t o  give i t  "a  t w i s t  i n  a wrong direction". (5) I n  other words, 
even though MacKenziefs mil i tary administration was to  be provisional, it could s t i l l  
s e t  i n to  motion policies which would influence the l a t e r  direction of Rand affairs .  
Hence Milner, i n  an attempt t o  keep th i s  from happening, ordered that  no major changes 
were to  be in i t i a t ed  i n  this period and wanted men appointed t o  MacKenziers government 
who would serve only a s  caretakers. 
But the Uitlander reformers did not propose to  l e t  such an opportunity 
escape them: f o r  y e a s  they had thought of l i t t l e  e l se  but how best t o  administer 
the Rand. Given the power conferred by martial law, they intended to  u t i l i z e  it to  
give Rand af fa i rs  "a t w i s t "  i n  the i r  direction. It i s  the i r  actions and the motives 
behind them, as well a s  the reaction of Milner and his Secretary, G. V. Fiddes (who now 
served as  Robertst Po l i t i ca l  Secretary i n  the ~ ransvaa l ) ,  which concern us here. To 
f a c i l i t a t e  the discussion of some of the policies implemented by the MacKenzie 
administration it i s  best  t o  categorize them. To be reviewed w i l l  be the decisions 
regarding the importation of food, the resumption of control over private property, 
the location of the T r a n s d  capital ,  and,finally, the regulation of the resident 
Rand population. Each issue demonstrates different aspects of the in teres ts  and 
motives of the administration and the varied use made of the war-time opportunity t o  
mould post-war relations. 
The newspaper edi tor  Monypenny took the post of Director of C i v i l  Supplies, 
a job complicated by the disruption of t ra ins  by De Wet and his men on the veld, by 
the confiscation of local ly produced fresh meat by the m, and by the poorly stocked 
l o c d  shops. The l a t t e r  w a s  the resul t  of Johannesburg merchants having had a 
d i f f i cu l t  time importing items and because there had been extensive commandeering by 
Boer o f f i c i a l s  and looting by dest i tute  people during the f i r s t  seven months of w a r .  
While the Br i t i sh  army was responsible f o r  feeding its own men a s  well as  the burgher 
population, Monypenny had t o  provide f o r  al l  other civi l ians,  including the black 
workers attached to  the Imperial Military Railww. When M d e n z i e  had entered the 
Rand the army was already desperately short of supplies, and by midJune no more than 
a fortnight 's provisions f o r  civi l ians w a s  on hand. ( 6 )  Shortages begat crime, with 
railway workers and Africans l iv ing  on the compounds of the now i d l e  mines turning t o  
thef t  a s  a means of obtaining firewood and food. The administration feared tha t  white 
men, also des t i tu te  and without work o r  r e l i e f  aid, would turn t o  larceny i n  order t o  
survive. (7) 
But Monypenny was not solely concerned with feeding the people; he also 
sought t o  ensure that  the in t e res t s  of Br i t i sh  merchants, f o r  the most part i n  exi le  
a t  the coast, were protected and that the foreign merchants s t i l l  i n  Johannesburg did 
not benefit  from any resumption of trade. Part icular ly distasteful  to  the exiled 
merchants was the f ac t  tha t  prices se t  by the military, which were up t o  three times 
the normal (i.e. pre-war) level ,  generated high prof i t s  f o r  the exclusive benefit  of 
resident merchants. While a l l  foreign merchants were held i n  contempt, the Germans 
and the Jews on the Rand were singled out as  the worst offenders: the men who had 
aided the enemy but now reaped the reward of Br i t i sh  ru le  and Rand restoration. (8) 
One of Monypennyts first moves to restrict the-business of non-British 
merchants was his attempt to withdraw their trading licences and thereby close their 
shops. Fiddes, who overturned this regulation, explained to the Military Governor 
that merchants had a right to sell to whomever they chose and foreign merchants could 
not be interfered with solely because they had traded with the Boers. (9) Not long 
afterwards Monypenny was asked to devise a scheme whereby goods would be stockpiled 
at Johannesburg in order that the Uitlander refugees could begin to return home. 
Monypenny, while doing as he was asked, created a system which ensured that the 
interests of the absentee merchants were protected. Goods, he decided, would be 
purchased at the coast and sent by train to the Rand where they would be held until 
a full 6000 tons of supplies were accumulated. Though owned by individual merchants, 
these supplies would be held by the Director of Civil Supplies until the Uitlander 
traders were in residence, this being done to "secure fair play to the refugee 
merchant, and allow all merchants to start business simultaneously1'. (10) 
This scheme also assisted Uitlanders because the 6000 tons of supplies were 
funnelled through the colonial ports in order to by-pass the foreign merchants at 
Louren~o Marques who had previously stockpiled goods there in the belief that the 
Johannesburg-Lourenr;~ Marques railway would be the first to reopen. (11) Further, 
the merchants at Johannesburg found it difficult to remit money to the coast with 
which to purchase a share of the 6000 tons. On the other hand, the loyalist merchants 
at the coast faced no such problems: needless to say, the administration took great 
pleasure in this state of affairs. Although this scheme collapsed when the return 
of the Uitlander refugees was postponed in October 1900, food remained a weapon in 
the arsenal of the Rand administration. 
Another problem facing the Uitlander advisers was how to deal with the 
houses left vacant by departing Uitlanders which had been occupied by Boers and pro- 
Boers during the first seven months of war. Commandant Schutte, Ecause's predecessor 
and chairman of the Johannesburg Rust en Orde Commission which governed the Rand 
after 1899, followed a policy of installing Boer refugees and favoured Johannesburg 
residents in empty Uitlander houses. (13) Complicating this matter for the new 
British administration was the llKruger Proclamation" which had been announced at the 
beginning of the war. In a move to protect his commandos, Kruger had proclaimed that, 
as long as martial law was in force, residential property owners could not claim rent 
from their tenants nor could banks c h g e  interest on mortgages to their borrowers who 
had used residential property as collateral. (14) Naturally, the "rent proclamation" 
was abhorrent to rentiers, even though the more astute owners were well aware that 
residential property could command little rent during the wax because departing 
occupiers had actually begged people to live in their homes rent-free in order to 
protect them from looters. (15) 
In an attempt to re&n control of private property, the MacKenzie regime 
first ordered that no vacant liouses were to be occupied without the permission of 
the mi1ita.q and that f'urniture could no longer be moved without the governmentt S 
and the owner' S written consent. (16) Yet the problem remained: how to eject tenants 
who claimed that the l1&uger Pr~clamation~~ meant that they neither had to move nor to 
pay rent. Douglas Forster, MacKenziets Legal Adviser, sympathized with owners but 
declared that, legally, nothing could be done. Forster wanted to protect the 
rentiers' rights and to see the proclamation abrogated; until this could be done, he 
rejected the idea of setting up a court to arbitrate between tenants and owners for 
fear that it would give the proclamation and the tenants1 claims some standing in 
law. Consequently, it was left to MacKenzie to solve the problem, and on the 6th 
July he wrote to his Legal Adviser: 
I propose to deal with all these house cases 
individually on their merits. I shall, where 
necessary, eject the occupier of a house, by 
military escort, and let the ejected one obtain 
his satisfaction afterwards by civil court if he 
likes. Please select and bring me ... the more 
pressing cases. (17) 
Fiddes soon entered the discussion and suggested that  a special Commission 
be nominated t o  determine the impact of the proclamation upon property relations i n  
Johannesburg. MacKenzie appointed a "Rent Committee" but i ts  membership was so 
overwhelmingly drawn from the propertied class  - rent iers ,  land and mining company 
off ic ia ls ,  etc. - tha t  i t s  very existence generated unrest among the Uitlander 
refugees a t  the coast, who feared that  the i r  r ights  as absentee tenants were about 
to  be infringed. Further, the Committee's membership fuelled the already vociferous 
discontent amongst refugees concerning "capi ta l i s t ic  appointments" made by MacKenzie 
and Roberts. Consequently, Milner was forced to  s t a t e  that  the Rent Committee was 
only advisory and that no changes were contemplated with regard to  the "Rent 
Proclamation". A s  a resul t  the advisers a t  Johannesburg were no closer to gaining 
the legal  power t o  expel unwanted tenants, and property r ights  continued to  be 
violated. (18) 
While the men i n  the MacKenzie administration sought to  make immediate 
changes, they were also concerned with long-range issues. Of most in teres t  i n  the 
ea r l i e s t  months of this period was the i r  attempt to  get the seat  of the new colonial 
government moved from Pretoria  to  Johannesburg. It was a scheme in i t i a t ed  by these 
men and was explici t ly meant t o  serve the in teres ts  of the Br i t i sh  industrial and 
business community i n  the Transvaal. Because neither Milner nor Chamberlain would 
sanction the move - Milner afraid that  to  do so would appear t o  the anti-capitalist  
c r i t i c s  as  though his policy was dictated by an "extreme Uitlander clique" (19) - the 
men a t  Johannesburg attempted t o  influence policy through the press. 
Monypenny, using his Times connection, made sure that the advisers' 
position favouring removal of the capital  to  Johannesburg was presented i n  London. 
Soon, however, Milner asked Chamberlain to  give the Times' s t a f f  an informal hint  
that  t o  continue t o  publicize the i r  cause would only play in to  the hands of the 
enemy. (20) Then MacKenzie 1 S advisers convinced the unsuspecting Roberts to  
approve the publication of the m, which they planned to  use to  "educate" the 
mil i tary and t o  champion the capital  issue. Milner, unwilling to  convey h i s  r ea l  
reasons to  Roberts, asked tha t  the permission be rescinded since it would be unfair 
t o  other publishers who had previously been denied permission t o  reopen on the Rand. 
Roberts complied, and the agi tators  G advisers were therefore denied the i r  hearing. 
Fiddes was deeply relieved, and wrote to  Milner: "I was only just  i n  time to get 
the thing right: it was a close shave." (21) 
During th i s  controversy Fiddes and the Uitlanders i n  Johannesburg had 
continually locked horns. Not only had the i r  actions angered h i m ,  but the High 
Commissioner grew increasingly exasperated with the i r  at t i tude and behaviour. It was 
during this a f f a i r  tha t  Monypenny wasned Fiddes that, even i f  every member of the 
Br i t i sh  cabinet wanted the capital  a t  Pretoria,  the men of Johannesburg "could and 
would prevent itv1. To make matters worse, he then threatened: "the Br i t i sh  
government could govern [the] Transvaal without [the] Dutch, but not without 
Johannesburg." (22) Such ta lk  caused Milner to  change his opinion of the 
Johannesburg advisers and the i r  a b i l i t y  to  do the task s e t  before them. Where i n  
l a t e  June he was able t o  forgive the i r  enthusiasm - l ' i t  i s  only natural that  they 
should go i n  f o r  a b i t  of a fling" (23), he counselled Fiddes - within weeks he was 
fed up with the "at t i tude taken up by persons who seem to  think they can combine the 
role of government o f f i c i a l s  and pol i t ica l  agitators". (24) By July he thought them 
"too b ig  f o r  the i r  boots" and was increasingly concerned with the i r  "High Jinksfl. (25) 
Fiddes, closer to  the scene, just called them a "sad l o t  of advisers" and informed 
Milner that he saw h i s  task as  convincing them that "Lord Roberts i s  a t  l e a s t  
Suzerain of the Johannesburg Republic (and . . . I am h i s  Grand vizier)".  (26) 
Fiddes not only aggravated the advisers by h i s  stance on the capital  and 
newspaper issues but because, ear l ie r ,  he had reversed some of the i r  more aggressive 
measures. For instance, when he d v e d  i n  the Transvaal he found that  the old 
reformer H. C. Hull had in i t i a t ed  a regulation which levied f ines on burghers of 
d i s t r i c t s  where commando raids took place. It also forced prominent burghers to  r ide  
i n  goods trucks and vans up and down the railway l i n e s  as  "hostages" i n  order t o  
assure that  the t ra ins  were not attacked. Reportedly, H u l l  had rushed this through 
i n  order t o  "make things hot" f o r  Sammy Marks ( a  powerful financier who had benefited 
from the W g e r  regime) and others t o  whom the f'reformers had an antipathf'. Fiddes, 
a f t e r  countermanding the order, noted that  it had not been a "military precaution, 
but a weapon f o r  private spite". (27) 
Fiddes also took an in teres t  i n  the so-called "Star Chamber", a body 
constituted, as  he put it, "to examine anyone on oath about anything". (28) After 
Fiddes attempted t o  "c l ip  the w i n g s "  of the body, he was urged by Monypenny and 
Samuel Ehas t o  permit i t  t o  continue i t s  enquiries into "acts of rasca l i ty  - 
thieving, looting under the guise of commandeering and so forth" which occurred on 
the Rand during the f i r s t  seven months of the w a r .  He consented h its continued 
operation on the condition that ,  f i r s t ,  no one was required to  incriminate himself 
and, secondly, "no pol i t ica l  vengeance i s  . . . wreaked thereby". (29)  But there i s  
l i t t l e  doubt that  these conditions did not r e s t r i c t  the actions of the body, f o r  
f i l e s  are extant which demonstrate that MacKenzie's "Committee of Investigation" 
was very concerned with pre-war events and antagonisms. (30) 
Without doubt, the boldest policy undertaken by the MacKenzie administration 
was the one which sought t o  eliminate undesirable elements from the Rand. The 
"undesirable" category included a wide range of people, i n t e r  al iar  foreigners 
(often but not exclusively Russian o r  Polish ~ e w s ) ,  the al ien dest i tute  (most of the 
Br i t i sh  poor had been removed during the Boer administrative period), criminals of 
al l  nat ional i t ies  a s  well as  po l i t i ca l  enemies and labour agitators.  Many people 
were removed a s  t ra i tors ,  some f o r  the i r  involvement i n  a l'plot" to  overthrow the 
MacKenzie regime. There were then,and there remain, doubts as  to  the existence of 
the "plot" i n  other than the minds of administrators. Further, while i t  may have 
been legitimate to remove disruptive elements from a sensitive area during time of 
w a r  - and foreigm consuls agreed with the Br i t i sh  government that it was - i t  i s  now 
c lear  that  the deportations were not motivated solely by such concerns, but rather by 
long~term goals. Indeed, the ent i re  Imperial administration from Milner downwards 
took delight i n  seeing the undesirables removed from the old Republics and especially 
from the Rand. 
On the weekend of 13-14 July l 9 O O  some 460 men were asrested i n  
Johannesburg, and all  but two - and these two were a mistake - were non-British, non- 
bur&er foreigners. Some were taken from the i r  homes a s  they prepaxed f o r  bed and 
were ordered t o  stand with scant clothes i n  the winter's night a i r .  Others were 
rounded up as they l e f t  cafes, some as  they walked the s treets .  A l l  ended up i n  
jail where they spent one o r  two nights asking why they had been arrested, demanding 
t o  see the i r  consuls, and receiving l i t t l e  other than stony silence o r  v e r b d  abuse 
from the i r  guads. On the 15th - without being allowed to  col lect  fresh clothing o r  
t o  secure the i r  possessions - most were boarded i n  third-class compartments o r  c a t t l e  
trucks and sent by r a i l  t o  East London, where the majority were soon loaded on the 
"Hawarden Castle" bound f o r  Europe v i a  the Cape. Most l e f t  this ship, and others 
which were to  follow, i n  Holland, though a few of the deportees went on t o  London 
where they were met and thereafter  watched by the police. 
I n  theory, these men had been implicated i n  a "plotn t o  overthrow the 
Johannesburg gaxrison while the majority of the soldiers were off duty and attending 
a horse race (hence, the "Race Course Plot"). Also, i n  theory, the men were i n  
communication with a Boer commando some 12 miles away which was to  secure an 
advantage as  a resul t  of the coup. (1n fac t ,  according to  army records, some of the 
Boers were captured i n  the v ic in i ty  i n  July and sentenced t o  POW camps i n  Ceylon.)(gl) 
I n  the following weeks some i n  the administration were d issa t i s f ied  with these 
arrests.  Major O'Brien, President of the Military Tribunal a t  Johannesburg, a t t e s t s  
to  the paranoia of the Dis t r ic t  Conrmissioner: even a f t e r  the asrests  he continued 
t o  hold a "very blue view of our position here and [was] f'ull of anaschist plots  fo r  
clearing off al l  the high officials",  a fear  OfBrien did not shase. (32) MacKenzie 
f e l t  insecure because he thought tha t  the "plot" had i n  par t  been a resul t  of the 
scascity and high cost of food and was well aware that  this was a s i tuat ion not 
l i ke ly  to  change. (33) 
Deportations did not stop with these first few hundred. Just  a week l a t e r  
a second sweep of the c i t y  gathered more foreign undesirables and they too were 
loaded up and sent away. I n  fac t ,  contemporary estimates indicate that  there were 
about 20 people expelled daily from Johannesburg a t  the end of August 1900 and the 
historian Spies s t a t e s  tha t  over 4000 aliens were deported from the whole of southern 
Africa before the end of 1900. (34) Deportation, then, became an important tool 
with which t o  eliminate from the new colonies people whom the administration thought 
"undesirable". 
l 
Naturally, pro-Boers were a target,  and throughout the w a r  they were 
forwarded from the Rand to  the Cape, much t o  Milner's chagrin. (35) On the other 
hand, Milner was delighted when some 1400 NSASM (~epublican railway) employees, w i t h  l 
t he i r  families, were deported soon a f t e r  the capture of Johannesburg. ( 3 6 )  The I 
criminal community was an obvious source of deportees, with people being expelled l 
f o r  a variety of ac t iv i t ies :  from distr ibut ing i l l i c i t  l iquor to  blacks to  chwging 1 
prices above those s e t  by Monypenny. (37) Others were deported f o r  being without 
the necessary papers, f o r  having "no se t t led  occupation" or  simply because they i 
"were unable to  give a proper account of themselves". (38) I 
In August l901 deportation was put t o  another use: the eviction from the 
Rand of Br i t i sh  miners who downed tools over wage rates.  I n  that month ninety-five 
white men struck work on the May Consolidated Mine i n  an attempt t o  get  the i r  pay 
raised above the max imum (5 / -  per day plus rations) s e t  by the army and the Chamber 
of Mines. After hearing of Kitchener's pronouncement that  "employees of the 
Johannesburg minestt ought to  be as  ready a s  other people i n  the Empire t o  "display 
the necessary self-sacrifice and patriotism", s ixty of the ninety-five s t i l l  
refused to  work. Police Commissioner Davies then warned them that  i f  they did not 
return to  work he would see them escorted over the border. Thirty-five miners t r i ed  
to  c a l l  his bluff and were accordingly marched t o  the s ta t ion  and sent to  the coast 
to  await the end of the w a r  with the r e s t  of the exiles. The explusion of s t r ikers  
had the desired effect ,  f o r  reports f i l e d  a t  the time noted tha t  "none of the 
employees on the other [mining] properties w i l l  resort  t o  the ill-advised course 
adopted by the May [consolidated] workmen". (39) 
But deportation w a s  not confined t o  people who, through the i r  actions, 
brought themselves to  the at tent ion of the authorities.  Nor were war-related 
concerns the sole reasons f o r  expelling people. Rather, it was the intent  of the 
Transvaal and Johannesburg governments t o  remove from the new colony people who could 
hinder the development of the post-war ideal  society. The powers conferred on the 
administration by martial law enabled i t  summarily t o  e jec t  people who i n  peace-time 
would be more d i f f i cu l t  to  remove. After several hundred deportations had taken 
place, Fiddes explained the policy to  Milner: 
... in  the future in teres ts  of the country we ought 
t o  c l e w  out a l o t  of the foreigners, and the actual 
pretext f o r  doing so i n  many cases is  not easy t o  
find. I n  f ac t  we must use the arbi trary w i l l  of the 
Militazy f o r  the purpose, (40) 
While Milner concurred - "it is  of course most desirable t o  get r i d  of foreign r i f f -  
raff" (41) - he w a s  t o  remain concerned with the potential diplomatic repercussions 
of lags-sca le  deportation and sought t o  ensure that the expulsions appeared 
legitimate and followed humane and formal principles. 
Roberts and Fiddes had not l e t  such considerations stop MacKenzie and h i s  
advisers. I n  early July the l a t t e r  sought Robertsfs approval t o  deport all  "four 
year burghers" - i.e., men who had acquired burgher r ights  since the Jameson Raid. 
He explained his reasoning t o  h i s  superior: ". . . i f  carried out here this measure 
would r i d  [the] town of some two thousand Peruvian and other low class  ~ews[,] i n  
f ac t  al l  the criminal class." (42) Roberts and Fiddes, rather  than re jec t  such 
duplicity, sought t o  carry i t  even further. Fiddes responded t o  MacKenziefs request: 
[~ober t s ]  considers that  no action should be taken 
against the Jewish population as  a class  nor indeed 
need the word 'Jew' be mentioned. But there is  no 
doubt that  the 'Peruvians' are a wholly objectionable 
element, and the more of them that can be sent down 
the better.  It i s  a matter f o r  the Military and 
wherever you have reasonable grounds fo r  suspicion 
against individuals they should be deported and 
severely dealt  with i f  they return without a permit. 
This measure, and possibly deportation under the head 
of 'military exigencies' ought t o  r i d  us of a 
considerable portion. (43) 
Hence, the Johannesburg administration w a s  encouraged t o  u t i l i z e  i t s  power 
to  remove people who, before the w a r ,  had allegedly contributed to  the corruption, 
inefficiency and crime about which the reformers had complained. I n  the following 
weeks and months the MacKenzie regime was to  concoct a variety of excuses which would 
just i fy the expulsion of "objectionable" people. 
A s  previously mentioned, food remained a weapon i n  the hands of the 
administration and i n  December l9OO it was used to  remove people from the Rand. I n  
that  month MacKenzie proclaimed that  only burghers, foreign consuls and members of 
the Rand Rifles,  a local  guards' uni t  whose membership was confined to  Br i t i sh  men, 
would be permitted to  buy food from government stores. The r e s t  of the population - 
i.e., foreigners - was faced with the alternatives of starvation or  exile. Kitchener 
defended the action by s ta t ing  that  the food shortages which made such a system 
necessary had resulted from "foreign Jew ringleaders . . . buying up all [the] supplies 
t o  make a large . . . prof i t  when [the] railway failed". (44) But the foreign consuls 
put pressure on Kitchener and he was forced to modify the MacKenzie regulation so 
that  the 'lprivilege" of buying food was extended t o  people whose consuls would ensure 
they were " f i t  and proper persons t o  enjoy it". S t i l l  Kitchener would not be 
defeated, and he quietly warned consuls that  they should not abuse the i r  power by 
granting too many cer t i f ica tes ,  f o r  i f  they did i t  would debar them from any l a t e r  
"representations". None the less ,  Fiddes expressed doubts a s  t o  the effectiveness of 
the revised proclamation and feared that  the consuls would not comply with Kitchener's 
directive, thereby rendering the "object of the Proclamation nugatory". (45) 
Other examples of pol icies  designed t o  mould Rand society could be mentioned 
but they would only demonstrate h r t h e r  the extent t o  which the Uitlander advisers and 
the military were willing to  go i n  an attempt t o  achieve the i r  goals. But s t i l l  the 
question remains: What were the i r  goals? Clearly they were complex and were rooted 
i n  the in teres ts  of the administrators and the i r  perception of what was best  f o r  the 
Rand and Johannesburg. The policies reflected the i r  xenophobic procl ivi t ies  and were 
generated as  much by the w a r  as by the i r  desire to  r i d  themselves of business 
competitors and the "dangerous classes". The attempt to  remove criminals is, of 
course, understandable, especially i f  viewed i n  relat ion to  pre-war Rand society w i t h  
i t s  extensive i l l i c i t  l iquor trade, thef t  and police corruption. The "Peruvians" ( a  
euphemism fo r  East European Jews) were blamed f o r  most of the crime and were therefore 
a prime target of the w a r  and post-war regimes. 
The policies were not solely reactive, but sought to  achieve a positive end. 
I n  fac t ,  the goal was much the same a s  tha t  sought by Milner: t o  revi ta l ize  the Rand 
economy and use i t  to  generate the pol i t ica l  and economic development of the Br i t i sh  
Transvaal Colony. The attempt t o  move the capital  i s  just one example of this, for  
the advisers sought to  place it where i t  could best  respond to  the needs of 
industr ial  capitalism. 
Finally, the MacKenzie administration did give Rand a f fa i r s  a "twist" ,and 
post-war policies, such as  r e s t r i c t ing  the municipal franchise o r  transferring non- 
whites and undesirable whites from the c i t y  centre, reflected the methods and g o d s  
of these men. Further, many of the Uitlander reformers were t o  move in to  Colonial 
and Union government posts and u t i l i z e  the experience gained i n  the war .  The 
policies  they pursued there bore out the t ru th  of Wybergh's m a x i m :  "the l a s t  reward 
of doing good work i s  t o  have more work given one t o  do". (46) 
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